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SECTION 1813 OF THE ENERGY POLICY ACT OF
2005: IMPLICATIONS FOR TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY
Paul E.Frye*

I.

OVERVIEW

Rights-of-way across Indian lands are often as valuable as other resources located
within Indian country. The statutes governing grants of rights-of-way on Indian lands
are found at title 25 U.S.C. §§ 311 to 328. Applicable regulations are found in 25 C.F.R.
part 169. Federal control over rights-of-way is sufficiently pervasive for compensable
1
trust duties in the exercise of that control.
Title 25 U.S.C. §§ 311 to 328 form a "comprehensive scheme which completely
covers the subject of rights of way." 2 Sections 311 to 321, concerning rights-of-way for
specific purposes, 3 were enacted circa 1900; Congress enacted sections 323 to 328 in
1948 to provide for rights-of-way for all purposes. The policy behind the comprehensive
'4
right-of-way scheme is to protect Indians from "improvident grants of rights-of-way
and to "fully . . .protect Indian interests." 5

The statutes and regulations are to be
6

construed liberally in favor of the Native Americans.
The interplay of the specific and general right-of-way statutes is illustrated by
several cases. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Watt 7 discussed the interplay of

* Paul Frye is the principal of the Frye Law Firm, P.C., in Albuquerque, New Mexico. He represents the
Navajo Nation in right-of-way matters, and this paper reflects in large part research undertaken over many
years in representing the Nation and its members. Part IV closely tracks the author's statement on tribal
sovereignty submitted in a public scoping meeting held March 7 to 8, 2006, under Section 1813 of the Energy
Policy Act of 2005. However, the views expressed herein do not necessarily represent the views of the Navajo
Nation, but are those of the author only. The author also expresses his appreciation to Stella Saunders for her
comprehensive review of this article.
I US. v Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 223-24, 225 n. 29, 226 n. 31 and accompanying text (1983); Coast
Indian Community v. U.S., 550 F.2d 639, 654 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
2. Plains Elec. Generating & Transmission Coop. v. Pueblo of Laguna, 542 F.2d 1375, 1380 (10th Cir.
1976); see Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 211.
3. 25 U.S.C. § 311 (2000) (public highways); id at §§ 312-318, 320 (railroads and related telegraph and
telephone lines); id.
at § 319 (independent telephone and telegraph lines); id. at § 321 (pipelines). Sections 322
and 322a are special sections relating to the Pueblo Indians in New Mexico.
4. Loring v. U.S., 610 F.2d 649, 651 (9th Cir. 1979).
5. S.P. Transp. Co. v. Watt, 700 F.2d 550, 552 (9th Cir. 1983).
6. Star Lake R.R. v. Lujan, 737 F. Supp. 103, 109 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd, 925 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (per
curiam).
7. 700 F.2d 550.
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the 1899 railroad right-of-way statute 8 with the 1948 general right-of-way statutes. The
court concluded that the 1899 Act included no grant of the power of eminent domain to
the railroads 9 and established conditions with which prospective grantees must
comply. 10 Most importantly, the court concluded that the Secretarial requirement of
tribal consent-mandated for rights-of-way under the 1948 Act-was properly applied to
the 1899 Act. 11 Similarly, Plains Electric Generatingand Transmission Cooperative v.
Pueblo of Laguna12 found a 1926 condemnation statute 13 to have been impliedly

repealed by a right-of-way statute passed in 192814 and by the 1948 Act. 15 In effect,
Plains results in the necessity of obtaining the consent of the Pueblo Indians for rightsof-way across their common land. 16

Power Co.,

17

Finally, in Blackfeet Indian Tribe v. Montana

the court discussed the interplay of the 1904 oil and gas pipeline right-of-

way statute 18 with the 1948 Act. The Blackfeet court read the 1904 Act and the 1948
Act as "coexisting"' 19 and held that, with tribal consent, the Secretary of the Interior

could grant a fifty-year easement under the 1948 Act even though the more specific 1904

2
Act limited the term of oil and gas rights-of-way to twenty years. 0
The regulations governing rights-of-way over Indian trust land include special

provisions for rights-of-way for specific purposes, 2 1 and the general provisions of Part
169 also apply to those specific rights-of-way. 22

In the absence of a Secretarial

determination to the contrary, the right-of-way regulations promulgated
under authority
23
of earlier statutes will also apply to rights-of-way under the 1948 Act.

The generally applicable provisions contain requirements for tribal and allottee
consent to grant or renew a right-of-way, 24 permission to survey,2 5 the content of and

8. 25 U.S.C. §§ 312-318.
9 700 F.2d at 554-55.
10. Id.at 555. In reaching its holding, the court assumed the 1899 Act was a grant inpraesenti. The court,
however, strongly suggested that it was not. Id.
11. Id. at 556.
12. 542 F.2d 1375.
13. Pub. L. No. 69-211, ch. 282, 44 Stat. 498 (1926) (allowing condemnation of Pueblo lands).
14. Pub. L. No. 70-296, 45 Stat. 442 (1928), amended by Pub. L. 94-416, 90 Stat. 1275 (1976) and codified
at 25 U.S.C. § 322. Section 322 has independent significance as well. In 1976, it extended the provisions of 25
U.S.C. § 357 (authorizing condemnation of allotments) to the Pueblo Indians, practically foreclosing the
otherwise tenable argument that the 1948 Act (dealing with voluntary conveyances of rights-of-way) had
repealed§ 357 by implication. See Yellowfish v. City of Stillwater, 691 F.2d 926, 930 (10th Cir. 1982).
15. Plains,542 F.2d at 1378-79.
16. Lands of Pueblo Indians are held in common typically under grants from the King of Spain. See U.S. v.
Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 39 (1913).
17. 838 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1988).
18. 25 U.S.C. § 321.
19. Blackfeel, 838 F.2dat 1058.
20. Id at 1059.
21. E.g. 25 C.F.R. § 169.23 (2006) (railroads); id. at § 169.25 (oil and gas pipelines); id at § 169.26
(telephone and telegraph lines); id.at § 169.27 (power projects); id at § 169.28 (public highways).
22. See 25 C.F.R. § 169.23(a) (railroads); id.at § 169.25(a) (oil and gas pipelines); id.at § 169.26(a)
(telephone and telegraph lines); id.at § 169.27(a) (power projects); id at § 169.28(a) (public highways).
23. See 25 C.F.R. § 169.23(a) (railroads); id.at § 169.25(a) (oil and gas pipelines); id.at § 169.26(a)
(telephone and telegraph lines); id at § 169.27(a) (power projects).
24. 25 C.F.R. §§ 169.3, 169.19.
25. 25 C.F.R. at §§ 169.3, 169.4.
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stipulations to be included in an application for rights-of-way, 26 maps of definite
location, 2 7 survey requirements, 2 8 and the amount and means of disbursement of
consideration to the landowners. 29 The 1948 Act and the regulations permit the
Secretary to grant easements over allotted land without allottee consent in limited
instances. 30 Of some practical significance is the regulatory requirement in 25 C.F.R. §
169.12 that the Secretary of the Interior furnish the landowners with appraisals to assist
them in negotiations, a requirement often honored in the breach.
The regulations governing right-of-way termination require the filing of an
affidavit of completion. The failure to do so "promptly" subjects the right-of-way to
cancellation. 3 1 The regulations require the entire process to be completed anew if "any
change" from the original route is needed "on account of engineering difficulties or
otherwise." 32 Finally, the regulations prescribe the tenure of the right-of-way, 33 allow
for renewals, 34 and specify grounds for termination. 3 5 The most recent decision on the
termination regulations, Star Lake RailroadCo. v. Navajo Area Director,36 construes 25
C.F.R. § 169.20, including the "may" and "shall" language which could otherwise cause
confusion to developers and landowners alike.
The term Indian country "is most usefully defined as country within which Indian
laws and customs and federal laws relating to Indians are generally applicable." 37 In
1948, Congress provided generally that rights-of-way passing through Indian
reservations would retain their status as Indian country for criminal jurisdiction
39
purposes. 38 Congress soon thereafter applied that definition to civil jurisdiction.
Congress specifically included such rights-of-way in its definition of Indian country to
correct the "absurd results" of Supreme Court cases that construed the 1834 definition of
Indian country for purposes of criminal jurisdiction.
The absurd results that Congress
thought it corrected when it included reservation rights-of-way in the definition of Indian
country was the jurisdictional uncertainty introduced by the Supreme Court related to
rights-of-way. As explained by Richard Collins:
The Court in Clairmont v. UnitedStates, voided a conviction on the ground that the offense

26. Id. at § 169.5.
27. Id. at § 169.6.
28. Id. at§§ 169.7-169.11.
29. Id. at §§ 169.12-169.14.
30. See 25 U.S.C. § 324; 25 C.F.R. § 169.3(c).
31. 25 C.F.R. § 169.16.
32. Id at § 169.17.
33. Id. at § 169.18.
34. Id. at §169.19.
35. Id. at § 169.20.
36. 737 F. Supp. 103, 108-109 (D.D.C. 1990), aft'd, 929 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
37. Cohen's Handbook of FederalIndian Law 182 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., LexisNexis 2005).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (2000).
39. See Cal. v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 n. 5 (1987) (Title 18 U.S.C. § 1151
"applies to questions of both criminal and civil jurisdiction."); DeCoteau v. Dist. Co. Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.
2 (1975) ("[T]he Court has recognized that [title 18 U.S.C. § 1151] generally applies as well to questions of
civil jurisdiction.").
40. Richard B. Collins, Implied Limitations on the TerritorialJurisdiction of Indian Tribes, 54 Wash. L.
Rev. 479, 527 (1979).
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occurred on a right-of-way to which the Indian title had been extinguished. A similar
conviction was sustained in United States v. Soldana, on the ground that the right-of-way
by the grantee. Criminal convictions thus turned
in question was not owned in fee simple
41
on the refinements of easement law.

The modem Court reintroduced those anomalies in its dictum in Strate v. A-1
Contractors.4 2 In Strate, the Court overlooked Congress' definition of Indian country
for territorial purposes, then attempted to apply the "refinements of easement law" and
43
This dictum has spawned
ultimately ran roughshod even over those refinements.
wholesale jurisdictional uncertainty in the lower courts, especially in the Ninth Circuit
44
Court of Appeals.
II.

CONSENT AND CONDEMNATION

The federal right-of-way statutes "reflect a federal policy of avoiding or
minimizing the disturbance of the Indians' quiet possession of the restricted domains
they now occupy .... [That policy is] consistent with the public interest in preserving
the status of the . . . tribe[s] as . . . 'quasi-sovereign nation[s]. ' '4 5 Congress has

permitted condemnation of Indian allotted lands for certain rights-of-way in title 25
U.S.C. § 357 but has not permitted condemnation of tribal trust lands, even by federal
agencies.4 6 Moreover, when the Department of the Interior promulgated a proposed rule
to eliminate the requirement of tribal consent for rights-of-way in certain instancesincluding a situation where significant energy resources were at stake--Congress
stepped in, studied the situation, and, in effect, directed the Department to rescind that
part of the proposed rule. 47 The House Report determined that the reference in title 25
U.S.C. § 324 to Indian nations organized under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) was
not intended by Congress to mean that the consent of non-IRA tribes was not required.
To the contrary,
[t]he legislative history of the 1948 Indian Right-of-Way Act ...shows no congressional
intent that consent ought not be sought from "unorganized" tribes. The purpose of
including the consent requirement for "organized" tribes was merely to prevent implied

41. Id.at 527 n. 286 (internal citations omitted).
42. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
43. See id. at 456 (negating tribal court civil jurisdiction in a case involving an accident between two nonmembers on a highway right-of-way where the grantee did not have fee simple title and equating or "align[ing]
the right-of-way... with land alienated to non-Indians").
44. See Smith v. Salish Kootenai College, 434 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2006) (en bane) (affirming tribal court
jurisdiction over accident involving college-owned truck on a public highway within reservation); Bugenig v.
Hoopa Valley Tribe, 266 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2001) (en bane) (Hoopa Tribe may regulate conduct of nonmember on fee land within reservation); compare Big Horn Co. Elec. Coop. v. Adams, 219 F.3d 944, 950-52
(9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting tribal taxes on utility property on easement granted by the Secretary of the Interior
where right-of-way grant was equivalent of non-Indian fee land); Burlington Northern R.R. v. Red Wolf 196
F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 1999) (no tribal court jurisdiction over a "tort claim arising from an accident on a
right-of-way granted to a railroad by Congress").
45. N.M. Navajo Ranchers Assn. v. Interstate Com. Commn., 702 F.2d 227, 233 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
46. See U.S. v. Winnebago Tribe of Neb., 542 F.2d 1002 (8th Cir. 1976); U.S. v. 10.69 Acres of Land, 425
F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1970); Bear v. U.S., 611 F. Supp. 589, 599 (D. Neb. 1985), affd, 810 F.2d 153 (8th Cir.
1987).
47. See H. R. Rpt. 91-78 at 20 (Mar. 13, 1969).
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supersession of the [IRA] and the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act. 48
In addition, the House Report emphasized that provisions of Indian treaties, such
as the 1868 Treaty with the Navajo, independently require tribal consent to rights-ofway: "Some of the 'unorganized' Indian tribes have been guaranteed by treaties that no
non-Indians shall ever be permitted to settle upon or pass over their lands without their
' 49
consent. Such treaty stipulations are entitled to equal recognition with the [IRA].
The House Report, after almost two years of study and communication with the
Department of the Interior, concluded that the "Secretary's proposal for granting rightsof-way over tribal land without the consent of the tribe which owns it violates property
rights, democratic principles, and the pattern of modem Indian legislation" and that the
Secretary's assertion of such power is "contrary to law, as well as to good government,
and should not be entertained." 50 The House Report quoted with favor the Bureau of
Indian Affairs' opposition to the proposal, based in part on the fact that the consent
requirement "has greatly enhanced the ability of [non-IRA] tribes to manage their own
property and has strengthened their bargaining position with oil and gas pipeline
companies, electric power companies, and other applicants for rights-of-way on their
reservations." 5 1 The House Report noted the incongruity of the Secretary's proposal
with modem federal policy, 52 quoting President Johnson's message on Indian affairs
which urged the United States to engage in "partnership-not paternalism" and "affirm
53
[the Indians'] right to freedom of choice and self-determination."
The House Report's conclusions were based in large part on the principle of
consent of the governed. 54 That principle, although dishonored occasionally, is the
foundation of modern Indian legislation.55 Finally, the House Report observed that
straying from the consent requirement would likely result in "protracted and costly
56
litigation in the Court of Claims."
Congress gave further protection for Indian nations generally in the Quiet Title
Act, which does not waive the United States' sovereign immunity in suits seeking to
establish rights in Indian lands. 57 Because the United States is an indispensable party in
such cases, 58 those suits will be dismissed. 59 Therefore, the court in United States v.
Pend Orielle Public Utility District60 ruled that "[t]he Utility may not condemn tribal

48. Id. at 26 (citing S. Rpt. 80-823 (Jan. 14, 1948)).
49. Id. at 9.
50. Id. at 3.
51. Id. at 8.
52. H.R. Rpt. 91-78 at 3, 17-19.
53. Id. at 18.
54. Seeid. at3, 17-19.
55. See Richard B. Collins, Indian Consent to American Government, 31 Ariz. L. Rev. 365 (1989).
56. H.R. Rpt. No. 91-78, at 12.
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a) (2000) (providing that waiver of government's sovereign immunity in quit
title actions "does not apply to trust or restricted Indian lands").

58 See Minn. v. U.S., 305 U.S. 382 (1939).
59. See e.g. Alaska v. Babbitt, 38 F.3d 1068, 1072-74 (9th Cir. 1994); Imperial Granite Co. v. PalaBand of
Mission Indians, 940 F.2d 1269, 1272 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating the Quiet Title Act poses an "insuperable
hurdle" to a suit to establish title to an easement across reservation land).
60. 28 F.3d 1544 (9th Cir. 1994).
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lands embraced in a reservation under the [Federal] Power Act or any other federal
statute." 6 1 This is consistent with case law holding that a certificate of public
does not
convenience and necessity from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
62
give the holder of the certificate the power to condemn federal lands.
63
However, the General
No law permits condemnation of tribal trust lands.
64
Allotment Act of 1887 -and other statutes providing for the allotment of reservation
land to individual tribal members 65-was designed to assimilate Indians into the
66
Thus,
dominant society and, ultimately, to destroy Indian tribes as institutions.
67-even
established
firmly
is
to
rights-of-way
consent
of
tribal
requirement
the
although
when the right-of-way is sought under a statute other than the 1948 Act (which
69
contains the tribal consent requirement) and when the United States is the plaintiff rights-of-way may be acquired over trust allotments by condemnation under title 25
U.S.C. § 357.7o Under § 357, the condemnation action must further a public purpose
under the laws of the state where the land is located. In addition, there may be federal
prerequisites to a condemnation action; for example, in the case of railroads, a certificate
of public convenience and necessity from the Interstate Commerce Commission is
required. 7 '
While the substantive law of the state will govern in actions under § 357,72 the
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over such actions, 73 the United States is an
indispensable party, 74 and state procedure will not apply. 75 Just compensation is

61. Id. at 1548 (citations omitted).
62. See Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 492 F.2d 878, 883-84 (10th Cir. 1974); see also
Skokomish Indian Tribe v U.S., 410 F.3d 506, 512 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (The tribe may seek damages
and equitable relief for flooding of its reservation authorized by the Federal Power Act.).
63. SeePendOreille,28 F.3d at 1548.
64. 48 Stat. 388 (1887).
65. See Cohen's Handbook of FederalIndian Law, supra n. 37 at 1040-41.
66. See N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast,425 U.S. 649, 650 n. 1 (1976); Quinault Allottee Assn. v. U.S.,
485 F.2d 1391, 1396 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
67. 25 C.F.R. § 169.3; Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. 100.95 Acres of Land, 719 F.2d 956 (8th Cir. 1983); S.P.
Transp. Co., 700 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1983); Plains Elec., 542 F.3d 1375; Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. Acting
Dep. Asst. Sec. Indian Affairs, 12 IBIA 49 (Dept. Int., Int. Bd. Indian App. 1983).
68. See S.P. Transp Co., 700 F.2d at 555 n. 3 (discussing railroad right-of-way under the 1899 Act).
69. See Winnebago Tribe of Neb., 542 F.2d 1002; 10.69 Acres of Land, 425 F.2d 317; Bear, 611 F. Supp.
589.
70. See e.g. Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 719 F.2d at 961; S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Rice, 685 F.2d 354, 357 (9th Cir.
1982); Nicodemus v. Wash. Water Power Co., 264 F.2d 614, 618 (9th Cir. 1959); Transok Pipeline Co. v.
Darks, 565 F.2d 1150, 1154-55 (10th Cir. 1977).
71. See Tampa PhosphateR.R. Co. v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 418 F.2d 387, 393 (5th Cir. 1969); see
also N.M Navajo Ranchers Assn., 702 F.2d at 233 (stating the Interstate Commerce Commission must take
into consideration effect on tribe's ability to be self-sufficient in decisions to grant or deny certificate of public
convenience and necessity).
72. See Star Lake R.R. v. Fourteen Rights-of-Way, 13 Indian L. Rptr. 3005, 3007 (D.N.M. 1985) (reviewing
cases applying state law to condemnation actions brought under 25 U.S.C. § 357).
73. Minn., 305 U.S. at 389.
74. Id. at 386; see also Nicodemus, 264 F.2d at 615; US. v. City of McAlester, 604 F.2d 42, 45-47 (10th
Cir. 1979); Town of Okemah v. U.S., 140 F.2d 963, 965 (10th Cir. 1944). The Secretary of the Interior is not
indispensable when the United States itself is a party. Transok Pipeline Co., 565 F.2d at 1153 (declining to
follow dictum in US. v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 127 F.2d 349 (10th Cir. 1943), affd, 318 U.S. 206 (1943)).
75. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co. v. US., 609 F.2d 1365, 1366 n. 2 (10th Cir. 1979); Town of Okemah, 140 F.2d at
966 (federal rules regarding service of process govern in cases brought under title 25 U.S.C. § 357.).
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required 76 with the property being valued at the time of the taking. 7
A tribal court may not grant a right-of-way over a trust allotment. 78 However,
where the United States supports the position of the tribal government, access to mineral
79
properties over both federal and tribal lands may be blocked by tribal officials.
Litigants have employed section 357 to resolve old trespass claims, succeeding in one
case to bar historic damages by invoking a state statute of limitations. 80 Section 357
does not, however, contemplate "inverse condemnation." 81 Finally, § 357 may not be
successfully employed to condemn interests in allotted lands which are beneficially
owned in part by an Indian tribe. 82 A tribe may acquire such fractional interests by gift
deed, by purchase, or by complying with the requirements of the amended Indian Land
83
Consolidation Act.
III.

A.

RIGHTS-OF-WAY FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSES

Railroads

Railroads may acquire rights-of-way through trust land either by having complied
with the requirements of the 1899 Act or by complying with the requirements of the
1948 Act. 84 The 1948 Act itself prescribes no specific limitations on railroad rights-ofway, nor does it set forth any detailed procedures under which applications for railroad
rights-of-way will be processed. 85 Its most significant feature is the consent requirement
of title 25 U.S.C. § 324.
The 1899 Act itself contains no tribal consent requirement. However, the Act does
contain numerous provisions with specific requirements to obtain a right-of-way through
Indian land. Examples of these requirements include construction of passenger and
freight stations at government town sites, 86 the filing and approval by the Secretary of a
map of the survey of the proposed line, 87 detailed procedures to be employed where the
applicant is unable to reach agreement with the Indian "occupant or allottee" on the
matter of compensation, 88 forfeiture provisions, 89 and-most importantly for railroads

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See U.S. v. City of Pawhuska, 502 F.2d 821,824 (10th Cir. 1974).
See generally Chippewa Indians v. U.S., 305 U.S. 479 (1939).
See Fredericksv. Mandel, 650 F.2d 144 (8th Cir. 1981).
See Super. Oil Co. v. U.S., 353 F.2d 34 (9th Cir. 1965).
Etalook v. Exxon Pipeline Co., 831 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1987); cf Hammond v. Co. of Madera, 859 F.2d

797 (9th Cir. 1988) (awarding trespass damages of reasonable rental value, consequential damages flowing
from trespass, and attorney fees to allottees from county for constructing, maintaining, and utilizing county
roads in violation of right-of-way statutes and regulations).
81. US. v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 258 (1980).
82. Neb Pub. Power Dist., 719 F.2d at 961.
83. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2221 (2000 & Supp. 2006).
84. See S.P. Transp. Co., 700 F.2d at 554; see also Blackfeet, 838 F.2d at 1058 (regarding interplay of the
1904 Act concerning pipeline rights-of-way and the 1948 Act).

85.
86.
87.
88.

See 25 U.S.C. §§ 323-328.
Id. at § 312.
Id. at § 314.
Id. The completion of such procedures appears to be a precondition to filing any action related to a

desired right-of-way in federal court Id.; see e.g. Aircraft & Diesel Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 767 (1947)

(holding that Congress may condition access to the federal courts upon completion of administrative
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proposed for the transport of natural resources on or through Indian lands-width
limitations of fifty to one hundred feet on either side of the center line, depending on the
necessity for heavy cuts and fills. 90 The Act requires compliance with "such rules and
regulations as may be prescribed" by the Secretary. 9 1 These regulations require the
9
consent of Indian tribes, 92 and that regulatory requirement has been upheld. 93
The regulations combine the features of both acts. The consent requirement for
tribes and allottees under the 1948 Act is found at 25 C.F.R. § 169.3 and is applicable to
all types of rights-of-way. Both title 25 U.S.C. § 324 and 25 C.F.R. § 169.3(c) allow for
the grant of a right-of-way over allotted lands without landowner consent if:
1. the land is owned by more than one person, and a majority of the interests consent;
2. the whereabouts of an owner is unknown and a majority of the owners whose
whereabouts are known consent;
3. the heirs or devisees of a deceased owner have not been determined, and the grant will
not cause substantial injury to the land or any owner; or
obtain their consent, and
4. the owners are so numerous that it would be impractical to 94
owner.
any
or
land
the
to
injury
substantial
no
cause
will
grant
the
In addition, the regulations allow the Secretary to grant a right-of-way over an allotment
without the consent of a minor or an insane owner if there is no substantial injury to
either the land or the owner which could not be adequately satisfied by monetary
damages. 9 5 Irregular or fraudulent consent forms will not satisfy either the 1948 Act or
25 C.F.R. § 169.3.96
Several requirements found in the 1899 Act-the width limitations, the
requirement that the line will be used as a common carrier of passengers and freight, and
the requirement that stations be constructed at each government town site-also appear
under the 1948 Act "[e]xcept
in the regulations. 9 7 These regulations govern9 applications
8
Secretary."
the
by
determined
otherwise
when
Under the 1899 Act, all requirements of the statute and regulations must be
complied with; construction will not suffice. 99 Prior to the 1948 Act, it was opined that

determinations); Marrone v. U.S. Immig. & Naturalization Serv., 500 F.2d 418, 420 (2d Cir. 1974) (requiring
exhaustion of administrative remedies).
89. 25 U.S.C. § 315 (Forfeiture may result from "failfure] to construct and put in operation one-tenth of its
entire line within one year, or to complete [the entire line] within three years.").
90. Id at § 313.
91. Id.at § 312.
92. 25 C.F.R. § 169.3(a).
93. S.P. Transp. Co., 700 F.2d at 552.
94. 25 C.F.R. § 169.3(c)(2)-(5). Only the first two of these sections would likely apply to a railroad rightof-way, because the construction of a railroad would almost certainly involve "substantial injury to the land."
95. Id.
at § 169.3(c)(1).
96. See N.M Navajo Ranchers Assn., 702 F.2d at 231-33; see generally Coast Indian Community, 550 F.2d
639.
97. See 25 C.F.R. § 169.23(b) (width limitations); id at § 169.23(f) (common carrier of passenger and
freight); id. at § 169.23(g) (stations at government town sites).
98. 25 C.F.R. § 169.23(a).
99. U.S. v. S.P. Transp. Co., 543 F.2d 676, 691-92 (9th Cir. 1976) (rejecting railroad's argument that actual
construction acquires right-of-way).
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the regulations limiting the width of the rights-of-way, based in the 1899 Act, could not
be waived by the Secretary.10 0 After the passage of the 1948 Act and in light of a recent
analogous case, 10 1 this conclusion is open to question as to applications made under the
1948 Act.
The forfeiture provisions of title 25 U.S.C. § 315 are absent from the regulations,
but termination for non-use or abandonment under 25 C.F.R. § 169.20(b) & (c) can take
place. 10 2 An early decision held that only the United States may assert forfeiture under §
315,103 and that holding has received additional support in principle. 10 4 It is doubtful,
however, that the Indian landowner has no independent recourse to seek damages,
105
cancellation, or forfeiture.
Special regulations apply to railroad rights-of-way across Indian lands in
Oklahoma, 106 implementing the Act of February 28, 1902.107 Once again, applications
under the 1948 Act in Oklahoma must also conform to these special regulations
10 8
"[e]xcept when otherwise determined by the Secretary."
B.

Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) Roads

For access purposes, BIA roads may be needed. 10 9 The regulations state that the
BIA roads are for "[firee public use."1l10 Part 169 of 25 C.F.R. governs the grant of
easements for rights-of-way for BIA roads,1 11 and these regulations require tribal and
1 12
allottee consent.
C.

Telephone and Telegraph Lines

Title 25 U.S.C. § 319 and 25 C.F.R. § 169.26 specifically deal with rights-of-way
for telephone and telegraph lines. The regulations
promulgated under § 319 will also be
3
applied to applications under the 1948 Act. 1'
100. Ariz. E. R.R., 52 Int. Dec. 594 (1929); Rights of Way-Station Grounds-Sec. 2, Act of March 2, 1899,30
Int. Dec. 599 (1901) (per Van Devanter).
101. Blackfeet, 838 F.2d 1055.
102. Star Lake R.R., 737 F. Supp. at 108. It seems clear, however, that the forfeiture provisions of § 315
have survived the passage of the 1948 Act, at least for any railroad right-of-way obtained under the 1899 Act.
103. Clarke v. Boysen, 39 F.2d 800, 815 (10th Cir. 1930).
104. Yavapai-PrescottIndian Tribe v. Watt, 707 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1983) (Secretarial involvement in lease
cancellations is required under title 25 U.S.C. § 415 and 25 C.F.R. § 162.14 despite contrary language in lease
approved by the Secretary.).
105. See generally Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 369, 373-74 (1968).
106. 25 C.F.R. § 169.24.
107. Pub. L. No. 57-26, 32 Stat. 43 (1902).
108. 25 C.F.R. § 169.24(a). The difference between, and interplay of, the 1899 Act and the Act of February
28, 1902, are explored to a limited extent in Midwestern Devs., Inc. v. City of Tulsa, 259 F. Supp. 554 (N.D.
Okla. 1966), affid, 374 F.2d 683 (10th Cir. 1967).
109. 25 C.F.R. § 170.1. 25 C.F.R. part 170 regulates the planning, design, construction, maintenance, and
general administration of BIA roads.
110. Id. at § 170.8. A caveat, however, is the traveling public. BIA roads are notoriously badly maintained,
and a recent decision holds that the discretionary function exception to the Federal Torts Claims Act bars
claims against the government for damages caused by the BIA's failure to maintain its roads. Walters v. U.S.,
2007 WL 209982 (8th Cir. Jan. 29, 2007).
111. Id. at§ 170.5(a).
112. Id. at §§ 169.3 & § 170.5(a).
113. Id. at § 169.25(a).
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Contrary local regulation of rights-of-way for telephone and telegraph lines is
preempted by federal law. 114 Section 319 does not authorize grants of easements for
115
rights-of-way for electric power lines.
D.

Pipelines

Title 25 U.S.C. § 321 and 25 C.F.R. § 169.25 specifically deal with rights-of-way
for oil and gas pipelines. The regulations promulgated under § 321 will also apply to
pipeline rights-of-way under the 1948 Act. 116 Individual Indian surface users within a
reservation may not interfere with the laying of pipelines if the tribe consents. 117 This
result is consistent with the decisions concerning other types of rights-of-way. 118
The court in Blackfeet Indian Tribe v. Montana Power Co. 119 reconciled the 1948
Act and title 25 U.S.C. § 321 (the 1904 Act). The court determined that the two statutes
can be read as coexisting, holding that the two statutes "gave the Tribe a choice between
either the 20-year term under the earlier statute or up to a 50-year term under the latter
statute. "120 The court found it unnecessary to determine which of the rights-of-way at
issue was granted pursuant to which statute, 12 1 even though the 1904 Act specifies a
maximum twenty-year term.
E.

Public Highways

Title 25 U.S.C. § 311 and 25 C.F.R. § 169.28 address rights-of-way for public
highways on Indian trust lands. The authority conferred by § 311 is available only to
public bodies, not to private corporations. 12 2 While § 311 expressly confers authority on
the Secretary to grant rights-of-way only for highways, the United States Supreme Court
has held that § 311 allows the construction of public utility lines within the highway
rights-of-way after the dissolution of the Indian reservation.123 While Secretarial
permission is required to obtain a right-of-way under § 311,124 Secretarial consent to
125
condemnation for public highways is not.

114. Muskogee Nall. Tel. Co. v. Hall, 118 F. 382 (8th Cir. 1902).
115. See Swendig v. Wash. Water Power Co., 265 U.S. 322, 327-28 (1924).
116. 25 C.F.R. § 169.25(a).
117. See Appleton v. Kennedy, 268 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Okla. 1967) (Osage Reservation).
118. See E. Band of Cherokee Indians v. Griffin, 502 F. Supp. 924 (W.D.N.C. 1980) (concerning right-ofway for public highway under 25 U.S.C. § 311); Hunger v. Andrus, 476 F. Supp. 357 (D.S.D. 1979) (same);
see also Dennison v. Tucson Gas & Elec. Co., I Navajo Rptr. 95 (1974) (holding that electric power line over
tribal trust land may be constructed with payment of compensation to holder of grazing permit).
119. 838 F.2d 1055.
120. Id. at 1059.
121. Id. at 1057 n. 2.
122. U.S. v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co.,318U.S. at210.
123. Id. at 217. Buried telephone cables may also be placed inside the highway right-of-way. US. v. Mt.
Sts. Tel. & Telegraph Co., 434 F. Supp. 625 (D. Mont. 1977).
124. Bennett Co. v. U.S., 394 F.2d 8, 15 (8th Cir. 1968); cf.San Felipe Pueblo v. Hodel, 770 F.2d 915, 917
n.2 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding that later consent by tribe validates Secretary's action taken without tribal
consent).
125. E.g. U.S. v. Minn., 113 F.2d 770, 774(8th Cir. 1940).
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Rights-of-Way "ForAll Purposes"

The 1948 Act 126 governs rights-of-way for all purposes across any Indian trust
lands. The 1948 Act expressly requires the consent of individual Indian allotment
128
owners and IRA tribes.127 The regulations apply the consent requirement to all tribes.
Just compensation is required, 129 and a BIA official exceeds his or her authority in
approving a right-of-way under the 1948 Act if the consent is lacking or irregular or if
compensation to the Native American owner is insufficient. 130
In determining
appropriate compensation, the Department must consider "the beneficial use and
economic value of the right-of-way." 13 1 Existing statutory authority empowering the
32
Secretary to grant rights-of-way is expressly preserved. 1
As one court has stated, "[t]he Act is puzzling. Section 2 [25 U.S.C. § 324]
requires tribal consent to all grants of rights-of-way, but Section [4][133] continues in
force many laws which grant the Secretary authority to grant rights-of-way without tribal
consent."' 134 As a practical matter, the Secretary had resolved this uncertainty of
whether the Act requires tribal consent by requiring by regulation--continuously since
1951-that tribal consent be obtained in all cases for all rights-of-way, and this
regulation has received the sanction of both the courts and Congress. 135 The courts have
also harmonized the 1948 Act with earlier right-of-way statutes, reasoning that the earlier
and later acts can and should be read to coexist. 136
IV.

THE IMPLICATIONS FOR FUNDAMENTAL TRIBAL RIGHTS OF SECTION 1813 OF THE
13 7
2005 ENERGY POLICY ACT

The Navajo Nation granted pipeline rights-of-way to the El Paso Natural Gas
Company (EPNG) in the 1950s and thereafter, all of which were to expire by their own
terms on October 17, 2005. The EPNG system extends for almost nine hundred miles
across the Navajo Reservation. The system includes a number of lines of varying
sizes-from thirty to forty-two inches in diameter--capable of delivering 3.8 billion
cubic feet of gas per day and actually delivering an average 2.5 billion cubic feet per day.
As the expiration date approached without an agreement for renewal in sight, and as
reports of compensation obtained by the Navajo Nation for other pipeline rights-of-way
surfaced, the Navajo Nation learned that EPNG was pursuing a strategy designed to
126. 25 U.S.C. §§ 323-328.
127. Id. at § 324.
128. 25 C.F.R. § 169.3(a).
129. 25 U.S.C. § 325.
130. Coast Indian Community, 550 F.2d at 650-54.
131. Memo. from Assoc. Sol., Div. of Indian Affairs, to Asst. Sec. Indian Affairs 3 (Sept. 6, 1995).
132. 25 U.S.C. § 326.
133. The court cited to § 3 but probably intended to refer to § 4 of the 1948 Act. See id.
134. Mt. Sts. Tel. & Telegraph Co., 434 F. Supp. at 629 n. 6.
135. See supra nn. 46-70 and accompanying text.
136. Blackfeet, 838 F.2d at 1058.
137. Part IV closely tracks the author's statement on tribal sovereignty submitted in response to the Section
1813 public scoping meeting held March 7 to 8, 2006. Paul E. Frye, Section 1813 of the Energy Policy Act of
2005: Implications for Tribal Sovereignty Territorial Management, and Economic Self-Sufficiency 6-26,
http://l813.anl.gov/documents/docs/Presentations/NNEPNGArg sov_paper3.26 06.pdf(Mar. 26, 2006).
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obtain renewal of its rights-of-way without Navajo Nation consent. The El Paso
Corporation (EPNG's parent corporation) had other problems, including the financial
burden of settlement with the State of California to resolve claims that it had
manipulated energy markets in the California energy crisis 13 8 and various shareholder
allegations. Those allegations included that the El Paso Corporation had misrepresented
its financial condition to the shareholders' detriment--engaging in Enron-style wash
trades, overstating reserves, providing risk-free investment opportunities to insiders,
improperly reporting mark-to-market values, filing false financial statements, conducting
to disclose material performance
and hiding off-balance sheet activities, failing
13 9
guarantees, and manipulating energy markets.
On March 8, 2005, in a letter written to Senator Pete Domenici (New Mexico), the
New Mexico Oil and Gas Association, of which EPNG is a member, proposed
amendments to the 1948 Act that would allow the Secretary of the Interior to issue "a
grant or renewal of a right-of-way, or expansion of a right-of-way by amendment" over
tribal land when the applicant and the tribe "cannot agree to the terms for the tribe's
consent." 140 The tribe would be allowed "just compensation" defined as the "fair market
value of the rights granted, plus severance damages, if any, to the remaining estate,
14 1
determined in accordance with generally accepted principles of property valuation."
Indian nations objected, and the proposal was not introduced by Senator Domenici or
anyone else. On September 29, 2005, EPNG submitted a letter and legal analysis to
Department of the Interior Solicitor Wooldridge, requesting that the Department grant
the renewals over the Navajo Nation's objections. 14 2 That submission urged that the
Navajo Nation's Treaty of 1868 constituted the Nation's consent, the Department's rule
requiring consent of non-IRA tribes such as the Navajo Nation was unlawful, and
requiring Navajo consent was inconsistent with EPNG's rights under its FERC
certificate. 143
Section 1813 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005144 is essentially Senator
Domenici's compromise. The initial version of that section required the Secretaries of
Interior and Energy to examine only the proper standards and procedures for determining

138. See Gary Chazen, Details Emerge on $1.7B El Paso Settlement, http://sacramento.bizjoumals.com/
sacramento/stories/2003/03/17/daily42.html (Mar. 21, 2003) (reporting that El Paso had settled California's
claim for damages in the amount of $3.3 billion by agreeing to pay the state $1.7 billion).
139. See Wyatt v. El Paso Corp., 2002-CV-2717 (S.D. Tex). The Wyatt case was consolidated with twentyseven other complaints by El Paso shareholders in the Southern District of Texas, and El Paso settled those
claims and similar derivative lawsuits for $273 million. Inside FERC 14 (Aug. 7, 2006).
140. Ltr. from Bob Gallagher, Pres., N.M. Oil & Gas Assoc., to Pete V. Domenici, Sen., Energy Rights-ofWay on Tribal Lands (March 8, 2005) (including proposed revisions to 25 U.S.C. § 324).
141. Id.
142. Ltr. from Thomas L. Sansonetti, Partner, Holland & Hart, to Sue Ellen Wooldridge, Solicitor, U.S.
Dept. Int., Renewal ofEl PasoNatural Gas Company's Rights-of-Way for InterstatePipelines CrossingLands
of the Navajo Nation (Sept. 29, 2005) (on file with author).
143. EPNG's view that the Secretary of the Interior may not impose conditions--such as the requirement of
tribal consent-that could conceivably unduly burden the project was based on inferences drawn from
Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765 (1984). The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit recently rejected that reasoning in City of Tacoma v. FERC, 460 F.3d 53
(D.C. Cir. 2006).
144. Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1813, 119 Stat. 594, 1127-28 (2005); Text: Section 1813, Energy Policy Act of
2005, http://1813.anl.gov/text/index.cfm (accessed Oct. 29, 2006).
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fair compensation for rights-of-way on tribal land and relevant national energy
transportation policies relating to energy rights-of-way on tribal land. Other senators,
notably Senator Jeff Bingaman (New Mexico), viewed that focus as too limited, and the
bill was expanded to include requirements that the study examine historic rates of
compensation paid for energy rights-of-way on tribal land and an assessment of the tribal
self-determination and sovereignty interests implicated by such rights-of-way. That
expanded version eventually became Section 1813.
The tribal response to Section 1813 was swift and unequivocal. The National
Congress of American Indians (NCAI) recognized that "the language of section 1813
could be read to justify the Federal government overriding fundamental principles of
tribal sovereignty and decision-making when they conflict with 'relevant national energy
transportation policies. ' 145 NCAI resolved to assist the Secretaries in the study "to
fulfill the goals of section 1813 while preventing any erosion of tribal sovereignty or
14 6
authority."
On March 7 and 8, 2006, the Departments of Energy and Interior held a scoping
session for the Section 1813 study. 147 The tribal presence and participation were
impressive. Former Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell set the tone of the meeting with
opening remarks that outlined the genesis of the study requirement and its
incompatibility not just with modem federal policy generally, but also with other
provisions of the 2005 Energy Policy Act that he authored which deal with Indian energy
148
resource development.
The comments at the scoping session were wide-ranging. The EPNG, Idaho Power
Company, and Fair Access to Energy Coalition, a front for EPNG represented at the
scoping session by EPNG's counsel, were the most emphatic in urging that a real
problem exists and may be appropriately fixed by federal legislation. 149 Business
owners complained that energy bills were too high and contended that unreasonable
Indians must be the cause. The Edison Electric Institute-whose members were
concerned about the uncertainty of the terms under which rights-of-way for electric
5
power lines could be renewed-ultimately expressed a desire for dialogue with tribes.' °
Other comments included those of Colorado politicians contacted by EPNG, which is
headquartered in Colorado Springs. A letter submitted by Colorado State Senator and
Assistant Majority Leader Jim Isgar recommended that, if the costs associated with the
compensation by tribes for energy rights-of-way "are an insignificant percentage of
145. NCAI, Res. No. TUL-05-110: Section 1813 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, https://www.ncai.org/
ncai/data/resolution/annual2005/TUL-05-1 I0.pdf (Nov. 4, 2005).
146. Id.
147. Meeting transcripts and comments are available at http://1813.anl.gov/documents/index.cfm.
148. See Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Commentary for the Section 1813 Tribal Energy Right-of-Way Study
http://1813.anl.gov/documents/docs/ScopingComments/Ben NighthorseCampbell.pdf 6 (Apr. 19, 2006).
149. See e.g. Nancy Ives, Presentationby FAIR Access to Energy Coalition Public Scoping Hearing on Sec.
1813 Study, http://1813.anl.gov/documents/docs/Presentations/FAIR_presentation 060307.pdf (Mar. 7, 2006);
Thomas L. Sansonetti, The FairAccess to Energy Coalition Presentationto the Departmentsof Energy and of
the Interior, http://1813.anl.gov/documents/docs/Presentations/Sansonetti-FAIR%2presentation.pdf (Mar. 7,
2006).
150. E.g. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Section 1813 Study on Indian Land Rights-of-Way" Transcript of
Presentationsand Comments Made at the March 8, 2006 Scoping Meeting, http://1813.anl.gov/documents/
docs/Meetings/8 Marchl 813_ScopingMtgtranscript.pdf 75 (Mar. 8, 2006).
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overall consumer energy costs, we may very well conclude that the cultural value
associated with preservation of tribal governments is worth that cost." 15 1 The words
used here, and the clear negative pregnant, reflect challenges that the Indian nations must
overcome in engaging in an open dialogue with elected officials.
Other industry comments presented a different picture than EPNG. Those industry
representatives talked of the benefits of including Indian nations as partners. 152 They
argued that the present system encouraged and empowered the Indian nations to become
actively involved in the energy production and transmission industry. Furthermore, this
active involvement accrued to the ultimate benefit of the industry, the consumer, and the
country's energy security.
Presentations and comments of the Indian leaders and representatives
predominated, and those comments were both persuasive and, in some cases,
impassioned. Those comments focused on three items: the unfairness of historic
compensation levels for rights-of-way; 1 53 the lack of any real present problem (except
for EPNG's inability to come to terms with the Navajo Nation); 154 and the potential
implications for tribal sovereignty, self-determination, and self-sufficiency of any
"solution" to the "problem" which would allow any company or agency to avoid the
tribes' fundamental right to exclude nonmembers and condition the entry of those
seeking to do business in the tribal territory. 1 55 The remainder of this article examines
that latter issue.
The objective of the proponents of the section 1813 study is to obtain rights-ofway (initial grants and renewals) over Indian tribal lands on terms to which the Indian
nation does not consent. This effort implicates the following sovereign interests of the
Indian nations:
1.

treaty guarantees (for tribes with treaties);

2.

the fundamental rights of an Indian nation to exclude nonmembers and the correlative

right to condition the entry of nonmembers seeking to do business in the tribal territory;
3.

regulatory authority, including tax authority, of Indian nations over nonmembers

conducting business within the tribal territory pursuant to a grant of right-of-way;
4.

tribal land use planning;

151, Ltr. from Jim Isgar, Colo. St. Sen., to Whom It May Concern, Testimony to Scoping Hearing (Mar. 2,
2006) (available at http://1813.anl.gov/documents/docs/Presentations/AssistantMajorityLeader.pdf).
152. Eg. Ltr. from Bill Barrett Corp., to Off. of Indian Energy & Econ. Dev., Section 1813 Scoping
Comments (Mar. 8, 2006) (available at http://1813.anl.gov/documents/docs/Presentations/BillBarretCorp.
pdO.
153. E.g. Maurice Lyons, Tribal Chariman, Morongo Band of Mission Indians, Tribal Case Study: Section
1813 Report (May 15, 2006) (available at http://1813.anl.gov/documents/docs/ScopingComments/
MOR_5_14_1813_CaseStudyFinal.pdf).
154. E.g. Position Paper of the Iicarilla Apache Nation on DOE/DO! Study of Energy Rights of Way on
Tribal Land
13-15
(May
12,
2006)
(available
at
http://1813.anl.gov/documents/docs/
ScopingComments/Jacarilla _ApacheNationRevisedPositionPaper.pdf); Ltr. from Council of Energy
Resource Tribes to Off. of Indian Energy and Econ. Dev., Section 1813 ROW Study 6 (May 15, 2006)
(http://1813.anl.gov/documents/docs/ScopingComments/Council of EnergyResourceTribes.pdf).
155. E.g. Ltr. from Rebecca A. Miles, Chairmen Nez Perce Tribal Exec. Comm., to Off. of Indian Energy
and Econ. Dev., Section 1813 ROW Study (Apr. 28, 2006) (available at http://l813.anl.gov/documents/docs/
ScopingComments/NezPercesection 1813_ROWStudy.pdf).
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5.

sanctity of contracts made with tribes and approved by the United States;

6. tribal rights to property (such as improvements) upon the expiration or other
termination of a right-of-way;
7. the ability of Indian nations to develop the tribal economy and fund essential
government services by either taking advantage of business opportunities related to access
over its lands or obtaining compensation for granting access to nonmembers; and
8. the continued adherence of Congress to the policy favoring tribal self-determination
and self-sufficiency or, alternatively, its drift to divestiture of fundamental tribal rights as
inconsistent with the dependent status of Indian nations and the perceived interests of nonIndians.
The following addresses these issues often with reference to the Navajo situation, but the
issues and analysis will apply to Indian country generally.
A.

Treaty Guarantees

Under the Constitution, treaties are the "supreme law of the land." 156 The United
States entered into many treaties with Indian nations until 1871 when treaty-making was
abolished. 157 Rights under these treaties are threatened by the proponents of the Section
1813 study.
The foundation of the relationship between the Navajo Nation and the United
States is a treaty negotiated in 1849 and ratified by Congress in 1850.158 Under that
treaty, the Navajo submitted to the federal government's "sole and exclusive right of
regulating the trade and intercourse" with the Navajo. 159 In exchange, the United States
promised to give the treaty a "liberal construction" and to "legislate and act as to secure
the permanent prosperity and happiness" of the Navajo people. 160 These commitments
indicate the federal government's "willing assumption" of trust duties with respect to
Navajo resources. 16 1 The United States also promised to "at its earliest convenience,
designate, settle, and adjust [the Navajos'] territorial boundaries, and pass and execute in
their territory such laws as may be deemed conducive to the prosperity and happiness of
62
said Indians."1
After subsequent skirmishes with local settlers and military authorities, the Navajo
people were marched on the Long Walk to a concentration camp in eastern New
Mexico. 16 3 There, about one-fourth of the Navajos died, and the federal government

156. U.S. Const. art. V1.
157. See Cohen's Handbook of FederalIndian Law, supra n. 37, at 74-75.
158. Treaty between the United States ofAmerica and the Navajo Tribe of Indians, 9 Stat. 974 (1849).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 975.
161. See JicarillaApache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 728 F.2d 1555, 1563 n. 1 (10th Cir. 1984)
(Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) on reh'g, 782 F.2d 1171 (1985), cert. denied, 497 U.S.
970 (1986).
162. 9 Stat. at 975.
163. See Garrick Bailey & Robert Glenn Bailey, A History of the Navajos: The Reservation Years 25 (U.
Wash. Press 1986); David M. Brugge, The Navajo Hopi Land Dispute: An American Tragedy 23 (U.N.M.
Press 1994) (citing Lynn Robison Bailey, Basque Redondo: An American Concentration Camp (SocioTechnical Bks. 1970)); Arthur S. Fleming, et al., The Navajo Nation: An American Colony 15 (U.S. Commn.
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recognized the failure of that ignoble experiment. Consequently, a second treaty was
negotiated and ratified in 1868.164 That treaty designated an area of about one hundred
miles square to be "set apart for the use and occupation of the Navajo tribe of Indians"
and further provided in Article II that the
United States agrees that no persons except those herein so authorized to do, and except
such officers, soldiers, agents, and employrs of the government, or of the Indians, as may
be authorized to enter upon Indian reservations in discharge of duties imposed by law, or
the orders of the
President, shall ever be permitted to pass over... the territory described
16 5
[in the Treaty].
1 66
The United States Supreme Court construed the 1868 Treaty in Williams v. Lee
as providing "that no one, except United States Government personnel, was to enter the
reserved area." 167 The EPNG pipelines pass through this treaty reservation, as well as
other lands set apart for exclusive Navajo use by later statutes and executive orders.
Article IX of the 1868 Treaty also provides that the Navajo will not "oppose the
construction of railroads, wagon roads, mail stations, or other works of utility or
16 8
necessity which may be ordered or permitted by the laws of the United States."'
EPNG contends that this promise constitutes advance tribal consent to its projects.
However, treaties with Indian tribes must be construed as a whole and, "[p]laced in
context, it becomes clear that this portion of the Treaty was concerned with a cessation
of armed hostility on the part of the Tribe." 169 This is consistent with the construction of
similar provisions in treaties made with other tribes. 17 Thus, the position of EPNG has
been squarely rejected by the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Interior Board
17 1
of Indian Appeals.
Certainly, Congress has not interpreted Indian treaties such as the 1868 Navajo
Treaty as either obviating the need for tribal consent or providing a blanket authorization
for private or public entities, licensed or not, to occupy or use tribal lands. The Navajo
treaty provision on which EPNG relies is present in numerous treaties with Indian
nations, yet Congress has passed several pieces of legislation specifically designed to
permit rights-of-way over all tribal lands. 172 These laws "reflect a federal policy of

on Civil Rights 1975).
164. Treaty with the Navajo Indians, 15 Stat. 667 (1868).
165. Id. at 668.
166. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
167. Id. at 221.
168. 15 Stat. at 670.
169 Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 731 F.2d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 1984), affid, 471 U.S. 195
(1985); see also id.at 600 n. 2 (noting "oil and gas operations [are not] a 'work of utility' for purposes of the
Treaty").
170. See Bennett Co., 394 F.2d at 15-16; U.S. v. 2,005.32 Acres of Land, 160 F. Supp. 193 (D.S.D. 1958),
vacated as moot, 259 F.2d 271 (8th Cir. 1958).
171. See Transwestern Pipeline Co., 12 IBIA 49; 43 C.F.R. § 4.1 (2005) (noting that the Office of Hearings
and Appeals acts as an authorized representative of the Secretary).
172. 25 U.S.C. §§ 311, 319 (highways, telephone lines and telegraph lines around 1900); id at §§ 312-318
(railroads, telegraph and telephone lines and telegraph lines in 1899); id. at § 320 (reservoirs or materials
within reservations related to railroad construction and operation in 1909); id at § 321 ("the construction,
operation, and maintenance of pipelines for the conveyance of oil and gas through any Indian reservation" in
1904); id. at §§ 323-328 (the 1948 Indian Right-of-Way Act, relating to "rights-of-way for all purposes ...
over and across any lands now or hereafter held in trust by the United States for individual Indians or Indian
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avoiding or minimizing the disturbance of the Indians' quiet possession of the restricted
domains they now occupy" and should be implemented "consistent with the public
interest in preserving the status of the .. tribe as a 'quasi-sovereign nation."'" 173 The
United States Department of Justice stated-in response to a similar effort by the
Transwestem Pipeline Company to obtain rights-of-way over the Navajo Reservation
without Navajo Nation consent that EPNG's interpretation of this treaty provision "is
completely at odds with the central purpose of the 1868 Treaty which was to secure the
benefits of peace and provide the Navajo Tribe with a 'permanent home' set apart from
' 174
non-Indian settlers."
In any event, applications submitted without evidence of tribal consent are not
encompassed in the treaty provision upon which EPNG and others may rely. That
provision refers to works of utility and necessity "ordered or permitted by the laws of the
United States." As stated in the government's brief in Transwestern Pipeline Co. v.
Clark, 175 when an application for an easement across Indian lands lacks evidence of
consent required by treaty, statute, or Interior regulations, such a
pipeline is not "ordered or permitted by the laws of the United States." A certificate of

public convenience and necessity issued by the [Federal Energy Regulatory Commission]
may indicate compliance with the laws administered by that agency, but not necessarily
agencies, including land management agencies such as the
with laws administered by other
76
Department of the Interior. 1
Decisions of the Court "have consistently guarded the authority of Indian
governments over their reservations. Congress recognized this authority in the Navajos
in the Treaty of 1868, and has done so ever since." 177 The desire of a relatively few
energy companies to obtain rights-of-way through Indian lands without tribal consent
threatens the currently recognized treaty rights of Indian nations.
B.

Right to Exclude; Right to ConditionEntry ofNonmembers

The tribal right to control use of reservation lands is not reserved to treaty tribes.
Congress confirmed pre-existing powers of Indian tribes in 1934, and those pre-existing
powers included the power to exclude nonmembers of the tribe from entering the
reservations. 178 That power necessarily includes the ability to set conditions on the entry
of nonmembers seeking to enter the reservation and conduct business there. 179 "A tribe
needs no grant of authority from the federal government in order to exercise this

tribes").
173. N.M Navajo Ranchers Assn., 702 F.2d at 233.
174. Memo. in Support of Mot. for P.S.J., Transwestern Pipetine Co. v. Clark, Nos. CIV 83-1884 & 84-0251
(D.N.M. Sept. 11, 1984).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 20-21; cf 25 C.F.R. § 169.3(a) (requiring applications to include evidence of tribal consent);
accord City of Tacoma, 460 F.3d at 65.
177. U.S. v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 558 (quoting Williams, 358 U.S. at 223).
178. Merrion v. JicarillaApache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 141-44 (1982); Babbitt Ford,Inc. v. Navajo Indian
Tribe, 710 F.2d 587, 592 (9th Cir. 1983); Powers ofIndian Tribes, 55 Int. Dec. 14, 48 (1934).
179. Quechan Tribe of Indians v. Rowe, 531 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1976); Ortiz-Barrazav. US., 512 F.2d
1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1975).
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80

power." 1
To effect this fundamental right, the Indian nations have long been recognized as
having the power to remove nonmembers who are not occupying tribal land under lawful
authority.181 The power to remove is incidental to the "general power of a government
as a landowner to remove intruders."' 182 Obviously, persons occupying land past the
terms of their grants no longer operate under lawful authority, yet the proponents of the
Section 1813 study seek legislative dispensation to effectively deprive Indian nations of
their ability to seek monetary relief from or otherwise deal with trespassers. 183 The
present effort to undermine the tribal consent requirement for initial grants and renewals
alike threatens the fundamental right of all tribes to exclude or remove nonmembers and
to condition the entry of those seeking to do business within the tribal territory.
C.

RegulatoryAuthority

The United States Supreme Court reversed the presumption of tribal civil and
regulatory authority over nonmembers in Montana v. United States.184 The Court now
presumes that Indian nations lack such authority with two exceptions: (1) where there are
qualifying "consensual relationships" between the Indian nation and the nonmember and
(2) where the nonmember's conduct "threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe." 185 The courts are
construing those exceptions narrowly in many instances.
If an Indian nation is divested of its right to maintain its fundamental gate keeping
function, either under a treaty or under its right to exclude, then the federal agency that is
authorized to grant rights-of-way over tribal lands will not necessarily have any incentive
to ensure that the rights-of-way it grants are conditioned on continuing tribal authority to
regulate and tax. If, under the authority of a federal statute, a federal agency grants an
easement without tribal consent and without such conditions, the affected Indian nation
may have severe difficulty in maintaining its authority to regulate and tax the entity
conducting business on tribal land. Especially with the implications of Strate and its
progeny, 186 reliance on Montana's consensual relationship exception, would seemingly
foreclose. Montana's other exception-threatens or has a direct effect on-would be a
slender reed to grasp in many cases. 187 Thus, any change to the present requirement of
tribal consent as a condition to a grant of easement for right-of-way imperils the tribes'
tax base, its related ability to provide the benefits of an organized society to its members
and nonmembers alike, and its ability to protect the health, welfare, and safety of the
180. Ortiz-Barraza,512 F.2d at 1179.
181. Powers ofIndian Tribes, 55 Int. Dec. at 49.
182. Id. at 49 (citing Canfieldv. U.S., 167 U.S. 518, 524 (1897)).
183. See Ltr. from David K. Owens, Exec. V.P., Edison Electric Institute, to the Off. of Indian Energy &
Econ. Dev., Section 1813 ROW Study 5 (May 15, 2006) (available at (http://l813.anl.gov/documents/docs/
ScopingComments/EdisonElectric-lnstitute.pdf).
184. 450U.S.544(1981).
185. Id. at 565-66.
186. See nn. 42-44 and accompanying text.
187. See e.g. Red Wotf 196 F.3d at 1064-65 (noting that the second Montana exception is triggered only
when the threat to the tribe's well-being is "demonstrably serious"; the threat or actuality of death or injuries to
just a few tribal members is not enough).
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tribal community.
D.

TribalLand Use Planning

Modem congressional policy recognizing inherent tribal sovereignty was affected
in 1934 with the enactment of the IRA.188 Section 16 of IRA attempted to secure the
preexisting powers of Indian tribes, and one subsection thereof is prefaced with the
phrase "[i]n addition to all powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal council by existing
law."' 189 The Interior Solicitor was asked to state what those powers were. 190 Solicitor
Nathan Margold did so, and those views regarding a statute to be administered by the
Department are entitled to great weight. 191
After an exhaustive examination of the case law, the Solicitor determined:
It clearly appears, from the foregoing cases, that the powers of an Indian tribe are not
limited to such powers as it may exercise in its capacity as a landowner. In its capacity as a
sovereign, and in the exercise of local self-government, it may exercise powers similar to
of private
those exercised by any State or nation in regulating the use and disposition
192
property, save insofar as it is restricted by specific statutes of Congress.
Zoning and land use planning are such typical governmental functions. These functions
have special importance to Indian nations, whose central values include a greater respect
or reverence for land and sacred sites. 193 The Supreme Court has recognized the power
of Indian tribes to zone, without regard for county zoning ordinances, "closed"
reservation land.194 That power permits Indian nations to protect sacred places and other
places of cultural significance-places that a federal administrator would likely not treat
195
with any special care.
Congress has attempted to remedy or ameliorate the checkerboard state of land
titles and jurisdiction resulting from the disastrous allotment policy. 196 After passing197a
variety of specific statutes intended to reestablish Indian title to "surplus" lands,
Congress prohibited any further allotment of Indian reservation lands in § 1 of IRA,
which applies to both IRA and non-IRA tribes. 198 Congress has attempted to foster
tribal land consolidation in "opened" Indian reservations in general legislation such as
the various iterations of the Indian Land Consolidation Act, which permits the Indian
nations to adopt land consolidation plans with the approval of the Secretary of the

188. Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2000)).
189. 25 U.S.C. § 476(e).
Dec. 14.
190. See Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Int.
191. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); Merrion, 455 U.S. at 139, 146 n. 12 (relying on Powers of
Indian Tribes, 55 Int.
Dec. 14).
192. Powers ofIndian Tribes, 55 Int.
Dec. at 55.
193. Cohen's Handbook of FederalIndian Law, supra n. 37, at 940.
194. See Brendale v. ConfederatedTribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
195. See Lyng v. NW. Indian Cemetery Protective Assn, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d
735 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
196. See Cohen's Handbook of FederalIndian Law, supra n. 37, at 78-79.
197. See e.g. Pub. L. No. 70-563, 45 Stat. 853, 899-900 (1928) (construed in HRI, Inc. v EPA, 198 F.3d
1224, 1251-54 (10th Cir. 2000)); Pub. L. No 66-359, 41 Stat. 1225, 1239 (1921).
198. See e.g. Begay v Albers, 721 F.2d 1274, 1279-80 (10th Cir. 1983).
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Interior. 199 In addition, both Congress and the executive branch have continued to act to
consolidate the tribal territory on a tribe-specific basis, using many different approaches,
including use of § 206 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976.200
Granting a federal agency the power to approve rights-of-way through reservation
lands is inconsistent with a tribe's ability to withdraw lands for special purposes, such as
parks. Elimination of the tribal consent requirement, with respect to the location of an
easement or other terms and conditions of its use, compromises the ability of the Indian
nations to exercise the fundamental governmental function of zoning and land use
planning needed to protect the health and safety of their members and visitors, promote
an aesthetically pleasing environment for the community, and protect places of religious
or cultural significance. Additionally, elimination of the tribal consent requirement
would exacerbate the checkerboard problem, thus violating longstanding federal policy.
E.

Sanctity of Contract

Governments, including tribal governments, enter into contracts. Those contracts
are interpreted under general contract law. 20 1 The United States can be held liable for
violating or impairing contract rights in the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker
20 2
Act and the "Indian Tucker Act."
Typically, right-of-way agreements with Indian nations are for a limited term of
years. Many agreements require the right-of-way grantee to leave peaceably at the
termination of the right-of-way agreement, and these agreements may also provide that
the tribe will become the owner of the improvements at that time. BIA requires that the
right-of-way agreement be consistent with federal regulations in 25 C.F.R. part 169,
including the regulations that require tribal consent for any renewal of the right-of-way.
Recent tribal agreements underscore that requirement by explicitly providing that there
shall be no right or expectation of renewal.
The Contract Clause of the United States Constitution 20 3 is, by its very language, a
limitation on the states only. 20 4 However, the Due Process Clause of the Constitution
provides essentially the same restraint against federal impairments of contract. 20 5 And
when there is no emergency-as the Departments of Energy and Interior expressly found
in the Section 1813 draft reports2°6 -and where a statute provides neither limited nor

199. 25 U.S.C. § 2203.
200. 43 U.S.C. § 1716 (2000); see e.g. Pub. L. 97-287, 96 Stat. 1225 (1982) (authorizing exchange of land
between the United States and the Navajo Nation); Pub. L. 94-114, 89 Stat. 577 (1975) (Submarginal Lands
Act, conveying title to lands in trust for seventeen identified tribes); 57 Fed. Reg. 33,733 (July 30, 1992)
(announcing exchange of lands within Navajo checkerboard area); Notice of Realty Action, 47 Fed. Reg.
56,409 (1982) (announcing exchange of federal lands within Navajo Indian country for lands outside that area
purchased by Navajo Nation); 25 Fed. Reg. 8546 (Sept. 3, 1960) (withdrawing 241,000 acres of land in
checkerboard area for Navajo use).
201. See U.S. v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996); Lynch v.U.S., 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934).
202. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491, 1505; see Winstar, 518 U.S. at913;Johnson v. U.S., 79 F. Supp. 208, 211 (Ct.Cl.
1948).
203. Art. I,§ 10 ("No State shall
... pass any... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.").
204. Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 278 n.31 (1969).
205. Lynch, 292 U.S. at579; N.W. Natl. Life Ins. Co. v.Jordan, 447 F.Supp. 856, 859 (D.Nev. 1978);
Johnson, 79 F.Supp.at211.
206. See infra nn. 228-32 and accompanying text.
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temporary relief from a true public exigency, a statute impairing contract rights does not
20 7
pass constitutional muster.
Industry proponents of changes to Indian right-of-way legislation often focus on
the asserted public interest in allowing renewals of the grant over tribal objections. In
cases where the right-of-way or related lease agreements call for a limited term, require
that the grantee leave peaceably on the expiration of the term, provide that the
improvements shall become the property of the tribe at that time, or provide that the
grant is subject to the applicable regulations, any modification of the tribal consent
requirement by the Congress would impair these contracts, subjecting the tribes and
industry alike to uncertainty because the sanctity of federally approved contracts in
Indian country is not inviolate.
F.

PropertyRights

Powers of Indian Tribes notes that the "powers of an Indian tribe with respect to
property derive from two sources. In the first place, the tribe has all the rights and
powers of a property owner with respect to tribal property." 2° 8 If any legislation would
permit rights-of-way over tribal land without consent and without just compensation, the
United States would be liable for a taking. 209 "Tribal land is the property of the Indian
2 10
tribe. It is not the property of the United States."
In addition, as noted above, many Indian nations have contract-based expectations
and property rights to the improvements constructed within rights-of-way on tribal lands
upon the expiration or other termination of the grant. Some, including the Navajo
Nation, have property or expectancy interests in compressor stations and other personalty
appurtenant to the pipeline right-of-way under the terms of business site leases executed
by the parties and approved by the Department of the Interior under title 25 U.S.C. §
415. Thus, any legislative action to extend the term of rights-of-way or related lease
rights without tribal consent would not only impair contracts but also constitute a
separate unconstitutional taking of tribal property.
As discussed below, the Indian nations are not acquiring these property interests
simply to extract more money from pipeline or other companies in the renewal setting,
although that is surely a legitimate interest. 2 11 Rather, the acquisition of these
improvements and facilities has been instrumental in tribes' efforts to attain selfsufficient economies and to increase production and transmission of energy resources
from and through tribal lands for the benefit of the tribal community and the non-Indian
public.

207. See Lynch, 292 U.S. at 579; W.B. Worthem Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426,430-34 (1934).
208. Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Int. Dec. at 50.
209. See generally U.S. v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103 (1935) (conveyance of tribal property based on
incorrect survey of tribal lands required "just compensation"; otherwise, conveyance "'would not be an
exercise of guardianship, but an act of confiscation') (quoting Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110,
113 (1919)).
210. H.R. Rep. No. 91-78, at 6 (1948)(footnote omitted).
211. See H.R. Rpt. 91-78, at 8.
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Economic Self-Sufficiency

The Navajo Nation was described a generation ago as an energy colony of the
United States.2 12 Other Indian nations have contributed to national energy security and
the comfort of their non-Indian neighbors, yet, like the Navajo, many tribal communities
lack basic services such as electricity, natural gas service, or running potable water in
homes. 2 13 Several Indian nations have recognized that access through and rights-of-way
within tribal lands are valuable assets that can be leveraged to provide a foundation for2 14a
self-sustaining tribal economy. Doing so is consistent with215federal policy generaliy
and with the energy policy of the United States, specifically.
For example, the Southern Ute Tribe recognized that outside developers were not
aggressively developing the Tribe's natural gas and coal bed methane resources, and that
pipeline access was part of the problem. It used its power to consent to rights-of-way to
obtain ownership of pipeline systems within the reservation, used its business acumen to
establish its own gathering company (the Red Cedar Gathering Company), and charged
that company with providing service to areas of the reservation where development had
languished for lack of gas gathering infrastructure. As a result, the Southern Ute Tribe is
achieved a level of tribal economic
producing more energy for the United States and has
2 16
self-sufficiency unheard of even a generation ago.
Similarly, a right-of-way for crude oil gathering pipelines and a main
transportation line serving two refineries located partly within the Navajo Nation expired
several years ago. Because the Navajo Nation had the power to consent (or not) to a
renewal, the Navajo Nation was able to engage in negotiations with the owner of the
refineries, plan for a smooth transition of ownership and operations of the pipelines to
the Nation's wholly owned and federally chartered petroleum company-the Navajo
Nation Oil and Gas Company (NNOGC)-and agree on fair tariffs to be submitted by
NNOGC to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. That acquisition and related
revenues provided funds for further upstream development of oil and gas resources by
NNOGC, and NNOGC, with industry partners such as Resolute Natural Resources
Company, has acquired producing (and typically neglected) oil properties within the
reservation. The end result has been a reversal of the decline curves for these properties,
more oil production for the United States, more revenues for the Navajo Nation to
provide needed public services to its people, and stability and certainty for the refinery

212. Fleming, et al., supra n. 163, at 22 ("[T]he status of the [navajo] reservation today is very much like
that of an underdeveloped nation in the grip of a colonial system.").
213. See e.g Dennis Romboy, Oil is Both Boon and Bane of the Reservation, http://deseretnews.com/dn/
view/0,1249,650193412,00.html (Sept. 25, 2006) (reporting that, even in the oil-rich part of the Navajo Nation,
one-third of Navajo households lack plumbing and eighty percent lack telephones).
214. See Cabazon Bandof Mission Indians, 480 U.S. at 217-18.
215. See Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self Determination Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, §§
501-506, 119 Stat. at 763-79; Indian energy provisions of the 1992 Energy Policy Act, codified at 25 U.S.C. §§
0
3501-3506 (For example, § 35 3(a) provides federal assistance for tribal energy vertical integration projects
"to assist Indian tribes in pursuing energy self-sufficiency . . . in order to increase development of the
substantial energy resources located on such Indian reservations.").
216. See Jeanne Dugan, Business Empire Transforms Life for Colorado Ute Tribe, Wall St. J. Al (June 13,
2003); Brian Newsome, Southern Ute Tribe's Earnings Exceed Projections, http://www.durangoherald.com/
asp-bin/articlegeneration.asp?articletype=biz&articlepath=/business/ biz020422.htm (Apr. 22, 2002).
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owner, a valued business partner.
Similar successes are being seen on other reservations, such as the Jicarilla Apache
Nation and the Northern Ute Tribe. 2 17 In these cases, the opportunities for tribal selfsufficiency, development of tribal economies, and greater energy production from tribal
lands result from the ability of the tribes to control land use, including rights-of-way.
Any legislation to undermine that power would seriously compromise these important
tribal and federal interests.
H.

The Directionof FederalIndian Policy

The Section 1813 study has the capability of providing crucial support for a
continuation of the modem federal policy of tribal self-determination and selfsufficiency. It also could portend a return to the nineteenth-century model of disregard
of the rights of tribes as sovereigns and landowners.
The House Report provides the starting point for this discussion. It found that
dilution of the tribal consent requirement would be contrary to "property rights [and]
democratic principles" and contrary to "law, as well as to good government." 2 18 The
report also found that circumventing tribal consent would violate "the pattern of modem
22
2 19
specifically the policy of honoring tribal self-determination. 0
Indian legislation,"
Since the House report was published in 1969, Congress and the executive branch
have consistently reaffirmed and strengthened the policy of tribal self-determination,
tribal self-sufficiency, and government-to-government respect. 22 1 The Energy Policy
Act of 1992 continued and applied that policy to tribal energy resources, including
specifically "the generation and transmission of electricity . . . [and] natural gas
distribution" 22 2 and the development and enforcement of tribal laws and regulations
regarding energy resources on Indian reservations. 223 The Energy Policy Act of 2005
advanced that ball even further, with its provisions authorizing the Indian nations to
control and develop their energy resources largely without federal supervision. 224 More
recently, Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman promulgated the Department's American
Indian and Alaska Natives tribal government policy that acknowledges that the "most
important doctrine derived from this relationship [between the Indian nations and the
federal government] is the trust responsibility of the United States to protect tribal

217. See Lucinda Dillon Kindead, Utes Thriving after Nearly Going Broke, http://deseretnews.com/
dn/view/0,1249,650192878,00.html (Sept. 25, 2006).
218. H.R. Rpt. 91-78, at 3 (Mar. 16, 1969).
219. Id
220. Id. at 18.
221. See e.g. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450, 458aa; William J. Clinton, Exec. Or. 13175, 3 C.F.R. 304 (2001); George
Bush, Statement on Signing the Department of the Interior and Related Appropriations, 1991, 26 Wkly. Comp.
Pres. Docs. 1768 (Nov. 5, 1990); Ronald Reagan, Statement on Indian Policy, 1983 Pub. Papers 96; Richard
Nixon, Special Message to Congress on Indian Affairs, 1970 Pub. Papers 564, 573; Lyndon B. Johnson, A
Message Relating to the Problems of the American Indians, H.R Doc. 90-272 (Mar. 6, 1968); see Kerr-McGee
Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195, 200 (1985).
222. 25 U.S.C. § 3503(a)(2).
223. Id. at § 3504(a).
224. See supra n. 48 and accompanying text.
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' 225

sovereignty and self-determination.
The notion that Indian rights-of-way regulations jeopardize interests of non-Indian
consumers is a smokescreen. 226 The proponents of the Section 1813 study would
reverse federal policy of respect for tribal self-determination-the only federal Indian
policy that has ever worked-to serve the narrow corporate interests of a small number
of energy companies who seek to diminish tribal rights in the interest of increasing
corporate profits.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Departments of Energy and Interior have produced two draft reports under
Section 1813. The factual findings of the initial Draft Report produced by the
Departments of Energy and Interior supported the tribes' position that adherence to the
consent principle is consistent with both national energy transportation policies and with
federal policy favoring tribal sovereignty and self-determination and is not inconsistent
with consumer interests. Specifically, the initial Draft Report concluded:
1. The requirement of tribal consent derives from the inherent sovereignty of the tribe,
and is a significant component of the federal government's policy of tribal selfdetermination.227
2. National energy transportation policies strongly support tribal decision-making
regarding energy right-of-ways on tribal land.228
3.

The Departments found no evidence that the requirement of tribal consent has
contributed to any emergency situation regarding energy.229
4.

Existing law provides the federal government with adequate authority to address any

emergency situation that might arise in the future.230
5. Determining right-of-way compensation through the process of negotiation is
consistent with the long-standing expressions of tribal sovereignty and self-determination

225. U.S. Department of Energy American Indian & Alaska Native Tribal Government Policy 1,
http://www.eh.doe.gov/oepa/guidance/cultural/finalindianpolicy.pdf (Jan. 20, 2006).
226. The Navajo Nation, for example, submitted an analysis of the impact of Navajo right-of-way
considerations on EPNG's consumers, which determined that those consumers would pay an additional seven
cents per month if EPNG accepted the Navajo Nation's opening offer. Charles J. Cicchetti, The Economic
Implications of Navajo Right of Way Fees 16, http://1813.anl.gov/documents/docs/NavCom/C-1CharlesCicchettireport.pdf (May 15, 2006). More striking, that study showed that the proposed Navajo
right-of-way consideration "would likely be less than one percent of comparable ad valorem taxes in the enduse states" although the governmental subdivisions imposing such taxes may provide no land rights. Id. at 14.
A second study submitted by the Navajo Nation determined that the proposed Navajo right-of-way fees were
comparable to those demanded by other governmental entities shouldering equivalent governmental duties.
Municipal Admin. Servs., Inc., A Report on Rights-of-Way (ROW) Compensation Review of Certain Local
Governments 6 tbl. 2, http://1813.anl.gov/documents/docs/NavCom/C-2_GeorgeWhiteReport.pdf (May 12,
2006).
227. Dept. of Energy & Dept. of Int., Draft Report to Congress: Energy Policy Act of 2005, Section 1813,
Indian Land Rights-of-Way Study § 2.4, http://1813.anl.gov/documents/docs/draftstudy/DraftStudyAug2006.
pdf (Aug. 7, 2006).
228. Id. at § 3.
229. Id. at § 3.2.1.
230. Id.
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in the federal-tribal relationship.231
6. Issues surrounding compensation
consequential to the general public.232

to tribes for energy right-of-ways

are not

7. It is unlikely that difficulties arising from right-of-way negotiations in the future could
lead to significant cost impacts to energy consumers or to significant threats to physical
delivery of energy supplies.233
Senator Domenici, who was the moving force behind Section 1813 of the 2005
Energy Policy Act, and Representative Joe Barton (Texas), the Chairman of the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce, reacted to the initial Draft Report by, in effect,
extending the deadline for the completion of the final report to analyze further the
"difficult issues" inherent in Section 1813, Representative Barton using language from
234
EPNG's playbook.
Consequently, the Departments published a second Draft Report and requested
comments on it. 235 With the benefit of comments from the tribes and industry on the
initial Draft Report, the Departments reaffirmed and strengthened their key conclusions.
The Departments found that "[t]he principle of tribal sovereignty is central to
understanding the statutory and regulatory requirement of consent," that a "tribe's
authority to confer or deny consent to an energy [right-of-way] across tribal land derives
from its inherent sovereignty-the right to govern its people, resources, and lands," and
that any reduction in the tribe's authority to govern its territory would compromise "its
sovereignty and abilities for self-determination." 236 It found that "[giranting a [right-ofway] on tribal land only with the consent of a tribe is in accordance with the federal
policy promoting tribal self-determination and self governance." 237 The second Draft
Report, therefore, recommends that "[v]aluation of energy [right-of-ways] on tribal land
238
should continue to be based upon terms negotiated between the parties."
The Departments also found that national energy policies favor "tribal involvement
in determining [right-of-way] routes, protections for cultural and natural resources, and
emergency matters." 239 In reaching this conclusion, the Departments relied on the
President's National Energy Policy and the Energy Policy Act of 2005.240 Moreover,

231. Id. at § 4.1.
232. Dept. of Energy & Dept. of Int.,
supra n. 227, at § 4.3.
233. Id. at § 4.4.2.
234. Lr. from Rep. Joe Barton to Sees. Bodman & Kempthome 2 (Sept. 8, 2006) ("In the long run,
consumers and our whole Nation benefit from fair access to energy supplies." (emphasis added)); Ltr. from
Sen. Pete V. Domenici to Sees. Bodman & Kempthome (Sept. 15, 2006) ("While I appreciate your
commitment to providing a final report to Congress in a timely fashion, I consider it more important that the
report be comprehensive.") (on file with author).
235. See 71 Fed. Reg. 77,060 (Dec. 22, 2006) (noticing the publication of the Draft Report to Congress,
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Section 1813: Indian Land Rights-of-Way Study (Dec. 21, 2006)).
236. Draft Rpt., exec. Summary at viii (Dec. 21, 2006).
237. Id.
at 19.
238. Id.at ix, 30. The Departments based this conclusion on two proclamations of President George W.
Bush. Id.at 17 (citing Presidential Proclamation 7500, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,641 (Nov. 12, 2001), and Presidental
Proclamation 7956, 70 Fed. Reg. 67,635 (Nov. 7, 2005)).
239. Id. at 12.
240. Draft Rpt., supra n. 236, at 7-9; 10-11.
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the Departments "found no evidence that negotiation between parties for 24obtaining
an
1
energy [right-of-way] on tribal land contributed to an emergency situation."
The Departments reviewed several economic studies submitted both by the tribes
and by industry representatives and concluded that tribal right-of-way consideration does
"not appear to be large enough to have a significant effect on overall energy
transportation costs and the total cost of delivered energy paid by consumers. ' 242 It
found "no evidence to date that any of the difficulties associated with [right-of-way]
negotiations have led to adverse impacts on the reliability or security of energy supplies
to consumers. ' 243 The Departments specifically rejected the arguments of some in the
industry who urged that tribal consent should not be required for a renewal after the term
of the right-of-way had expired:
[T]hese contracts were entered into with the full knowledge that they were for a fixed term
and that the company would have to enter into a renewal negotiation at some time in the
future.... [T]ribal sovereignty is a known and familiar part of the business landscape in
parts of the U.S. and should be recognized in any prudent business practice--especially
over the last 25 years. Companies can not expect
that terms of contracts would remain
244
static over time or the same for contract renewals,

These findings lead to only one rational recommendation: no legislation is needed
or desirable. As the Departments state,
[n]egotiations between Indian tribes and energy companies for the grant, expansion, or
renewal of energy rights-of-way across tribal lands have had no demonstrable effect on
energy costs for consumers, energy reliability, or energy supplies to date. Therefore, broad
changes to the current federal policy of self-determination and self-governance for tribes24 5
or the existing right of consent-are not warranted at this time.

However, the final report has not been submitted to Congress as of the date of this
writing, and industry-friendly officials in the Department of the Interior 246 may suggest
in the final report "options" or other legislative action to address the problem that has
been determined not to exist.
The NCAI, the Council of Energy Resources Tribes, the Intertribal Council of
Arizona, the Affiliated Tribes of Northwest Indians, and other tribal coalitions will be
crucial to the final outcome of the Section 1813 effort. It will be equally as important for
individual Indian nations to gain the active support of its industry partners, state and

241. Id.at 9.
242. Id.at 35.
243. Id.at 36.
244. Id. at 42; see id.at 46 ("In most cases, initial rights-of-way agreements are term contracts and no
guarantee or indication of renewal was given by the tribes or the federal government. Therefore, any renewals
represent, in essence, new contracts.").
245. Id.at 45.
246. See e.g. Cobell v. Norton, 229 F.R.D. 5, 7 (D.D.C. 2005), ("[O]ur 'modem' Interior department has
time and again demonstrated that it is a dinosaur-the morally and culturally oblivious hand-me-down of a
disgracefully racist and imperialist government that should have been buried a century ago, the last pathetic
outpost of the indifference and anglocentrism we thought we had left behind."), vacated, Cobell v.
Kempthorne, 455 F.3d 317 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Noelle Straub, Waste, Fraud,Abuse at Interior, http://www.
casperstartribune.net/articles/2006/09/15/news/wyoming/fdO826102d9f9fc687257Ie90081061d.txt (Sept. 15,
2006) (quoting Tom Davis (Virginia), Chairman of the House Government Reform Committee, decrying the
"culture of waste, fraud and abuse" at the Department of the Interior).
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local political leaders, and representatives and senators in Congress, in anticipation of
subsequent battles. The Council of Energy Resources Tribes and NCAI have offered to
be the primary coordinators of the tribal effort. The legal and factual positions of the
Indian nations on this matter are strong on the merits. Indeed, the Section 1813 study
should be an appropriate vehicle for recommendations to Congress to solidify tribal
interests in rights-of-way by providing a legislative fix for the Strate dictum, and its
progeny, and to provide real relief for energy consumers and tribes alike as mandated in
the 1992 Energy Policy Act, that is, to "develop proposals to address the dual taxation by
' 24 7
Indian tribes and States of the extraction of mineral resources on Indian reservations.
Congress may have passed Section 1813 under the misconception that there is a
problem with Indian energy rights-of-way that impacts consumers or national energy
security. To the contrary, the Indian nations are ameliorating energy problems with their
industry partners, thereby contributing to national energy security. Tribal representatives
have been able to show that the amounts paid by energy consumers attributable to Indian
energy rights-of-way are wholly insignificant. The true causes of the rise in energy bills
include global supply and demand, consolidation of oil companies, abuse of marketing
power by cartels, Enron-style market manipulation, extraordinary profit-taking, and
executive compensation. It is up to the Indian nations and their industry partners to
make sure that the facts are documented and persuasively delivered to Congress, and that
bedrock, treaty-based principles and the policy of respect for tribal self-determination are
honored.

247. 25 U.S.C. § 3505(k)(I).
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